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The validity of using local market data to measure the benefits associated 
with policies adopted in an urban area is investigated. 11 is shown that the rest 
of the world is affected by taxing decisions undertaken in a single urban area, 
so that local data cannot perfectly measure the welfare effects of a policy 
change. Specifically, the fact that the willingness to pay for a tax increase is 
posit,ive in the rest of the world suggests that coat-benefit analyses which do 
not account) for the rest, of the world may be biased. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous at’tempts have been made to utilize market data to measure 
the benefits associated with public policy changes in an urban area. The 
majority of bhese studies have attempted to determine the relationship 
between property values and certain policy-related variables, such as 
local taxes, expenditures, and environmental quality, in order to obtain 
an estimate of the willingness to pay for changes in these variables.’ 
Recent analyses of property valw studies have been critical of thrm, 
pointing to the fact that a correct measure of the benefits associated with 
a change in public policy must take into account the willingness to pay 
of all relevant economic actors in the urban area.2 
1 For reference to some examples of these property value studies, see Polinsky and 
Rubinfeld [2, 31. 
* See Polinsky and Rubinfeld [S] for a model in which the relationship between these 
economic factors and willingness to pay is discussed. 
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Because these methodological discussions focus on the measurement 
of benefit,s within one urban area in a large q&em of urban areas, it is 
usually assumed that the price of capital is unaffected by any local 
change in public policy, so that capital owners have a zero willingness 
to pay for the policy change. Such an assumption can be quite misleading, 
however, because the assumption that the price of capital changes 
insignificantly (so that it may be assumed constant), does not allow one 
to conclude that it is reasonable to assume t’hat t’hc value of capital 
(price times quantity) in the system of urban areas has changed negligibly. 
In fact, it seems quite plausible that the willingness to pay for a local 
policy change on the part of all owners of capital may be quite large. If 
so, there may be a substantial bias involved if one analyzes local public 
policy decisions without accounting for the willingness to pay of economic 
actors outside the urban area which is directly affected by the public 
policy change. 
To explore these issues, we utilize a model in which capital and land 
arc inputs in the production of a homogeneous good in a system of urban 
arcas. Land is fixed in each urban area, while capital is perfectly mobile 
among urban areas. The model is used to analyze the consequences of a 
newly imposed tax on all capital utilized in one urban area. We find that 
while the price of capital may change only slightly, the tax increase will, 
in general, result in a large decline in the value of capital in the system 
of urban areas, and conscquent’ly, a large negative willingness to pay of 
capital owners in the “rest of the world.” However, we also find that the 
willingness to pay of capital owners is to a large cxtcnt counterbalanced by 
the posit)ive willingness to pay of land owners in the rest of the world, 
so that the total willingness to pay for the policy change outside of the 
taxed urban area is a small fraction of the willingness to pay of capital 
owners. The fact that this total willingness to pay in the rest of the world 
is positive suggests (in the context of the model) that cost benefit analyses 
which account only for the urban area impacted by a policy change 
may be biased. Finally, we compare the magnitude of willingness to pay 
measured in the urban area in which policy changes occur and \villingncss 
to pay in the rest of the world. We find that the allocative bias associated 
with the measurement of benefits within t’hc impacted urban area will 
not necessarily be small. In one extreme case, one-third of the welfare 
effects of the tax take place outside of the taxed urban area. 
In Section II the model of production in a system of urban areas is 
formally presented. In Section III willingness t,o pay is defined in the 
context of this model, and the questions raised above arc rcformulatcd 
in terms of the model. The model is then used to analyze and at least 
partially answer the quest’ions. Section IV contains some conclusions as 
well as suggestions for extension of our analysis. 
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II. THE MODEL 
The following model is admittedly unrealist,ic, but is structured HO as 
to capture those feat’ures which are crucial to the cost-benefit issues 
raised in Section I. Consider a set of N urban areas3 each producing 
identical output by means of the production function 
y; = F(K/N, L/N), (2.1) 
where qi is the output of the ith urban area, K is the capital (or perfectly 
mobile) input, and L is the land (or immobile) input, and F is homoge- 
neous of degree 1. We assume that there is a fixed supply of capital K in 
t’he system, and a fixed supply of land, L/N in each urban area. Since 
land is fixed we will suppress the land input and represent the production 
function as f(K/N). We assume further that owners of capital and land 
have identical utility functions, with utility monotonically increasing 
in output. In this situation, utility maximization is equivalent to profit 
maximization, as both capital owners and landlords seek to maximize 
their claims on output. If it is assumed t,hat factor markets are compcti- 
tive, we may write t’hc first-order condition for profit maximization 
with respect t)o t’hc capit,al input of the ith urban area as follows4: 
.fK = $7 (2.2) 
where s is t,he rental price of capital and the subscript denotes the partial 
derivative with respect to capital. 
The assumption of competitive behavior in factor and output markets 
requires that the portion of output not claimed by capital owners be 
received by the landlords. Given our homogeneity assumption, this 
implies t’hat : 
r = ri = [yi - s(K/‘N)],‘(L/‘N), (2.3) 
where r is the annual rental price of land. Note that r and s are defined 
as claims on physical output per unit of input employed. This formulation 
obviates t’he need for explicit considerat’ion of changes in output price in 
the following discussion. 
Xow consider the impact of a newly imposed tax at rate t on t’he USF 
of capital in urban area 1.j To simplify the exposition which follows, two 
8 Each urban area may also be considered to be a single firm operating in a competitive 
market. 
4 We are implicitly assuming that FK, FI, > 0, and FKIC, EILI, < 0. 
5 We have chosen to consider a newly imposed tax rat,her t,han an increment, to an 
existing tax t,o simplify the analysis which follows. Our model yields subxt,antively t,he 
same results as a model which analyzes t,he impact, of a marginal (rat,her than a discrete) 
increase in preexisting tax. (For an alternative discussion of the relationship between 
marginal and nonmarginal changes, see Kraus Cl]). However, in the special case of a 
marginal change in t,he tax rate from a point of global optimality (no tax), there is no 
deadweight hjss, and the willingness t,o pay for the tax change is zero in all urban areas, 
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conventions are used; first, we associate upper case let,ters with the 
aggregate of the remaining N - 1 areas, and second, we associate 
variables with primes with the after-tax equilibrium. After the imposition 
of the tax, the first-order condition for the first urban area differs from 
the condit#ions for the remaining urban areas. In particular, for the first 
urban area : 
fl‘y = s’(1 + t). (2.4) 
The tax on capital will lead to an outflow of capital, AK, from the first’ 
urban area, which in our model will be utilized in equal proportions by 
the remaining N - 1 urban areas. Thus, the new output of the first 
urban area is: 
4’1 = 4’ = f(K/N - AK). (2.5) 
Of this output Q’, we assume that the revenue ts'(K/N - AK) is received 
by t’he “government” whose only role is to select fut’ure public projects 
which can be justified on cost-benefit grounds. In order for any tax- 
expenditure project to be so justified, the revenue must provide sufficient 
welfare to compensate capital and land owners for the excess burden 
introduced by the tax. In addition, the annual rental on land is computed 
(using the homogeneity and eompeCtive assumpt’ions) as a residual 
such that : 
~‘1 = [Q’ - a’(1 + t)(K,‘N - AK)]/(L/N). 
Finally, the output of the remaining N - 1 urban areas6 is : 
(2.6) 
Q’ = (N - l)f[K/‘N + AK/‘(N - l)]. (2.7) 
We shall also find it useful to take into account (as a result of the first- 
degree homogeneity assumption) that all nontaxed urban areas will earn 
zero profit’s before and after the tax change. Specifically, 
and 
Q = s(N - 1) (K/N) + r(N - I)(L/N) (2.8) 
Q’ = s’(N - l)[K/N + AK/(X - l)] + r’(N - l)(L/N). (2.9) 
III. MEASURIXG WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
Each economic actor’s willingness to pay is defined as the maximum 
amount of output per year which could be taken after the imposition of 
the tax in the first urban area and leave the individual no worse off than 
before. For owners of land willingness to pay is simply the aggregate 
change in output received as land rentals, while for the owners of capital, 
it is the aggregate change in output received as capit’al rentals, 
fi The original outpIt wu Q = (N - l)f(K/N), 
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TABLE; 1 
Willingness to Pay ACL’OIIII~S 
Taxed urban area 
Capital owners WI< = (s’ - s)(h’/l\T) (3. I) 
Land owners WL = (I’ - (/ - (s’ - s,(K/A:) + S’AK - k’(K/‘V - AK) (X.2) 
Government WG’ = ts’(K/N - AK) (3.3) 
Total w = WK + WI, + WG = (I’ - q + s’aK (3.4) 
Rest of the world 
Capital owners wh- = (s’ - s)(K/N)(B - 1) (3.5) 
Land owners w,, = (r’ - 7) (L,/X) (A’ - I) (3.6) 
Total II7 = WK + CVL = Q’ - Q - s’AK (3.7) 
Using tho model structure prcscnted in Section II, the willingness to 
pay of the relevant economic actors can be expressed analytically as shown 
in Table 1. We continue w-it)h our notational convention by using w to 
represent willingness to pay in t’he taxed area, and W t,o represent, 
willingness t’o pay in the rrst of the world. 
Equations (3.1), (3.5), and (3.6) in Table 1 follow directly from the 
definition of willingness to pay given above. For example, Eq. (3.1) 
measures the change in thr annual rental valw of the assets held bs 
owners of capital in thr taxed urban area. Note that the owners of capital 
in the rest of the world arc affected only by the change in the value of 
the stocks that they hold prior to t’he imposition of the tax. The outflow 
of capit’al to the rest of the world as a consequence of the tax does not 
create capit’al gains (or lossc~s), since capital users must pay a competitive 
price (8’) for any capital cmploycd. Analogously, capit*al owners in the 
taxed area do not obtain capital gains or losses because they reccivr the 
world compct’itivr price 5’ for uw of their capital. 
Equations (3.2), (3.4), and (3.7) follow from the first-order conditions 
of profit maximization and from the assumption that production is 
homogeneous of degree enc. For rxample, to obtain Eq. (3.7), we add 
Eqs. (3.5) and (3.6) to obtain: 
w = ((N - l)/.V)[(s’K + V’1,) - (SK + /,L)]. 
But, rewriting Eqs. (2.8) and (2.9) wr g& 




[(N - l)/N](s’K + r’L) + s’AK = &‘. 
Substituting (3.9) and (3.10) into (X.8) yields (3.7) dirwtly, 
(3.10) 
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Equation (3.2) (lquatcs the willingness to pay of land owwrs to the 
difference bctwcctn the tot,al willingness to pay in the urban arca (3.4) 
and the willingmass to pay of capital ownc‘rs (3.1) and t’hc govc>rnmM. 
(3.3). This result follows directly from our assumption that land owners 
receive t,he residual gains and losses associated wit’h thr tax change. 
The willingness to pay results are intuitively appc>aling. Equation 
(3.7), for examplr, states that annual willingness to pay in the rest of the 
world is equal to the increase in output due to the capital inflow, minus 
the annual rental value of the new capital. If this last, t’crm were not 
subtracted, double counting would be involved, since the new capital 
had to be rented at the competitive world rental price, and did not’ provide 
a capital gain to the capital owners in the rest of the world. Similarly, 
Eq. (3.4) states that annual willingness to pay in the taxed arca is the 
loss of output plus the annual rental value of t’hc capit’al outflow. The 
value of the capital outflow measures the portion of the capital loss which 
capital owners in the urban arca are shlc t’o recoup by renting thrir 
capital at’ the world price. 
Analysis of Cost-BeneJit Issues 
The equations listed in the willingness to pay accounts provide the 
basis for an analysis of the cost-benefit issues described in the introduc- 
tion to the paper. Specifically, we wish to show that : 
(1) The change in the annual rental value of capital in the rest of 
the world may not be small. 
(2) Willingness to pay of the rest of the world is small relative to 
the willingness to pay of capital owners in the rest of the world. 
(3) Willingness to pay in the rest of the world is positive, implying 
that a cost-benefit analysis associated with the imposition of a tax in 
one urban area is always biased so as t’o understate the true benefits to 
society of the project. 
(4) Willingness to pay in the rest of the world may be large in relation 
to willingness to pay in t’he urban area. Only when willingness to pay 
in the rest of the world is relatively small is it a good approximation to 
assume that all of the change in economic welfare will occur in the taxed 
urban area. 
Without further specifying the properties of the production functions 
involved, we are not able to obtain a simple comparison of the relevant 
magnitudes in the willingness to pay accounts. To permit more precise 
calculations of willingness to pay, therefore, we assume that the capital 
inflow to one urban area is sufficiently small so that j”KK is constant 
(i.e., ~KKK = 0) over the interval K/N to K/N + AK/(N - I).’ 
7 This implies that. the marginal product of capital diminishes at a coust,ant rate, and 
is equivalent to assuming that AK/(N - 1) is closely approximated by the differ- 
ential dK. 
xi:! COLJKAh’1’ AND HLJHINFE:LI> 
To analyzt~ th(x first assctrtion WV utilizck 1~:~~s. (2.2) and (2.7) to r(t\\.rit(, 
Eq. (X.5) as fOllO\\-s : 
WK = K(N - l),/N(j,[K,I:V + AK/(X - l)] - jK(K/.V)j (3.11) 
Rut, by our assumption, w(’ may write 
f~[K/iv + AK,‘(N - l)] = j,(K/‘N) +f,y~aK,‘(N - 1). (3.12) 
Substituting into (3.11) we get : 
WK = KfmAK/‘N. (3.13) 
In general, this term will bc negative, since ~‘K’KK is ncgativc. More 
importantly, howevcxr, the value of WK may be quite large, since th(lre is 
no reason t)o expect KAK to bc small in a system with a finite number of 
urban areas. Thus, we can conclude that the willingness to pay of capital 
owners in the rest of the world will bc negative, but’ not necessarily small. 
To provr the second assertion, we utilize the following expression for 
the increased output in the rest of the world: 
K/.l.+LM/ (.\ --I ) 
&’ - Q = (.\’ - 1) 
i 
fK (k)dk. (3.14) 
K/N 
Substituting into Eq. (3.7) and utilizing Eq. (3.12), we may write 
w = (S - 1) 
s 
K/.v+AK/ (S-1) 
[f,y (K/iY) + (fim) (x: - K/r\:)]& 
K,N 
- [fK(K/S) + (~KK)(AK)/(:V - l)]AK. (3.15) 
Integrating and solving we get : 
W = -fKK(AK)2/2(N - 1). (3.16) 
Thrn, dividing by WK in Eq. (3.13) and taking absolute values, WC get : 
j W/We1 = [AK,‘2K][N/(N - I)]. (3.17) 
The absolute value of W/W,, the ratio of the capital out,flow from the 
taxed area to twice the amount of capital in the world, is clearly small. 
The third assertion can be seen directly by noting that W is strictly 
positive in Eq. (3.16). To see this intuit’ively note that the change in 
output in the rest of the world is the result of an increase in capital and a 
decrease in the marginal product of capital, with the consequence that 
the price of capital falls from s to s’. On the other hand, the entire change 
in the capital stock is evaluated at the new world price 5’. Thus, the 
increased value of output, will exceed the absolute value of the change 
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in the capital st,ock by an amount equal to the arcla of a t)riangle with 
height (s - s’) and base AK.8 
111 considering the fourth assertion, it is no longer valid to use the 
approximation of a constant second derivative of output with respect to 
capital, since the capital outflow in the taxed area may be large relative 
to its total capital stock. However, we can obt’ain useful bounds for the 
ratio of willingness to pay in the taxed area, W, to willingness to pay in 
the rest of the world, W, by temporarily maintaining the assumption 
that fKK is constant, or equivalently that fKKK = 0. To obtain these 




I(’ = [fK(KlS) + (fKK) (I; - fvN)]dk 
KIN 
+ [~K(K/I~) + (fm)(AK)/(~v - l>]AK. (3.18) 
Intrgrating and solving, we get: 
w = C~KK(AW/~-J[W + 1)/W - I>]. (3.19) 
Then, dividing w by W in Eq. (3.16) and taking absolute values, we get,: 
I~LO/W( = (N + 1). (3.20) 
Thus, if J”KXK = 0, the magnitude of willingness to pay in the taxed area 
is exactly N + 1 times the magnitude of willingness to pay in the rest of 
the world. This estimate is useful because it provides a lower bound for 
the true ratio of w to W in the case where ~K~K > 0. In this case the 
marginal product of capital increases at an increasing rate as capital 
flows out of the taxed area. When compared to the case in which the 
marginal product increases at a constant rate (in Eq. (3.18)), the lower 
bound result becomes clear. 
An illustration of this is given in Table 2, which presents the values 
of key variables of the model for a Cobb-Douglas production function 
associated with different t’ax rates. The third partials of a Cobb-Douglas 
are, of course, positive, and it is readily seen that the ratio of lzc\ to 
j W 1 is greater than N + 1 in all cases. 
8 The third assertion is not dependent upon the simplifying assumption necessary t,o 
prove the first two assertions. This result follows after some manipulation if we subt,ract 
s’AK from both sides of Eq. (3.14) to obt,ain 
&’ _ & _ s’AK = (iv _ 1) K’Y+AK’(‘v-l) (fn-(k) -f&K/h’ + AK/(N - l)]\dk. 
Thii integral is always positive since the marginal product of capital is always declining 
over the range of integration. 
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t AK s’ WK W JVti II. 
__ ._. .__ _-~_ -- 
Case 1 X = 100 ; 
0.01 0.19 0.4999 -4.9 x IO-4 -4.9 x lo-’ -4.9 x 10-Z f-2.9 x 1Ok” 
0.1 1.72 0.4996 -4.3 x lo-” - 0.04 -4.3 x lo- +::.7 x 10-d 
1.0 7.48 0.4981 -1.9 x IO-2 -1.26 -1.9 f7.0 x IO-” 
Case 2; S = 10 
t AK s’ WK W M/K ct 
0.01 1.78 0.4995 -4.9 x lo-* -0.00,5 -4.4 x 10-1 +4.3 x 10-4 
0.1 15.90 0.4956 -4.4 x 10-l -0.41 -3.9 +:3.5 x 1wz 
1.0 72.97 0.4809 - 1.9 - 12.92 - 17.2 +6.8 X 10-l 
------.____ 
There is nothing in neoclassical production theory, however, which 
assures that fK~~ is everywhere positive. For oxamplc, it can be shown 
that a CES production fun&ion wit’h an elasticit,y of subst.it.ution less 
than 0.5 will have negative third partials at some factor rat,ios. By the 
same logic that’ makes N + 1 a lower bound of t,he ratio of [ II’ j to 1 W j 
where ~KKK is nonnegative over the relevant, range, it is clear that .V + 1 
is an upper bound for that ratio where fKKK is nonpositive. 
The situat,ion in which t,he ratio of 1 ‘LC 1to j W / is smallest occurs when 
the marginal product of capit,al rises negligibly in the taxed urban area 
as capital flows out, although it falls nonnegligibly in the rest’ of the 
world. To approximate this situation, we assume that the marginal 
product of capital remains constant in the taxed arca. Then Eg. (3.18) 
is simply 
+ [~K(K/S) + (~KK)(AK)/(:I- - l)]AK. (3.21) 
Equation (3.21) simplifies t,o : 
~KK CAP 
lf’ = __---. 
LV - 1 
(3.22) 
The absolut’e value of this last’ exprrssion is twice that of W, willingness 
to pay in the rest of the world. The implications of this may be quite 
serious. In the rather extreme case of Eqs. (3.21) and (3.22), fully one- 
third of t,he welfare effects of the tax take place outside the taxing 
jurisdiction-rcgardkss of the number of urban areas in the system. 
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IV. CONCLUSIOYS i 
To the extent t,hat t#ho modvl uwd in t’his papw is applicable to “rwl 
world” cost-benefit problems, the results derived in Section III establish 
t,hr following : 
(1) When the measurement of benefits is restricted to t’hc immediat’c 
urban area, the results of the cost&benefit analysis will, in general, be 
biased, in that a project which taxes a mobile factor in one urban area 
will (due to the outflow of that factor) lead to positive benefit’s in the 
rest’ of the world. However, the magnitude of that bias is likely to be small. 
(2) A project which is financed through a tax on a mobile factor 
will have important distributive implications in the rest of the world. 
Holders of the t’axed factor in the nontaxcd areas will experience capital 
losses several orders of magnitude larger than the net welfare gain 
experienced in those arcas. Furthermore, holders of other factors will 
receive capital gains slightly larger in magnitude t’han the capital losses 
experienced by holders of the taxed factor. Thus, although the allocative 
bias derived from a project undertaken in one urban area may be small 
in the rest of the world, thrrc can be a significant change in the functional 
income distribution of an entire syst’rm of urban areas due to the taxing 
policy of one urban area.g 
(3) While the allocative bias in cost-benefit analysis will always bc 
small in magnitude, it will not’ necessarily be small relative to excess 
burden in the taxing jurisdict’ion itself. Indeed, if the production function 
has a negative third partial with respect to capital, as much as one-third 
of t,hc total welfare effect may occur outside of the taxing jurisdiction. 
It might seem surprising to some readers that the willingness to pay 
in the rest of the world associated with the tax increase is not identically 
zero, since the tax impacts directly on the first’ urban area. For a non- 
marginal change in the tax rate, however, it’ is necessary to examine the 
impact on the rntire capit,al market t>o correctly calculate willingness to 
pay. This follows because the tax in t,hc first urban area wsults in an 
outflow of capital to the rest of the world, wi:ith only the last unit of capital 
being paid its marginal product. Since all of the inframarginal units of 
capital flowing into the rest of the world have been paid less than their 
marginal product, there is a net posit’ive willingness to pay in tho rest 
of the world. Of course, the world willingness t’o pay is simply the net 
9 Recalling that the model used here is equivalent, to a model of a syst,em of firms in a 
competitive industry, we conclude that the st,andard assumption that factor prices may 
be treated as roughly constant in response to a change in behavior in one firm is ap- 
propriate. However, the product of price times quantity (i.e., total factor returns) is 
not approximated by a constant. This is verified in Table 2. 
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loss in real output resulting from the tax. Thus, our conwrn licls with the 
problem of the dist)ribution of bcw4its among urban awas, a pwspcc’tiw 
which is somewhat diffcwnt from that of most cost bwcfit analysw. 
The central purpose of this paper has hrrn to invrstigatr the validity 
of using local market data t.o mcasuro the hcncfits associat,rd with policicls 
adopt’ed in a given urban awa. While a more cllaboratc> model. including 
more than one product, price changw, and a mobile labor force, can be 
expecbed to yield furthrr insights into this qwstion, the model presented 
here does provide a beginning. In brief, the rclst of the world is affected 
by taxing decisions undert,aken in a single urban area. Thus local data 
can never perfectly measure the wclfarc effects of a policy change>. 
However, the magnitude of the welfare change in the rest of the world 
is likely to be quite small, as a result of offsetting changes in factor r&urns 
that may br quite large. Thus, local policies can have important implica- 
tions for income distribution in a large system. P’inally, in what may bc a 
special case, but a special case that cannot’ bc rulrd out’ on theoretical 
grounds, the rest of the world may have good wason t’o be conccrncd 
with the t,ax policy in Peoria. 
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